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I. PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, Petitioner, BJ-Titan Services Company ("BJ-Titan") , 
respectfully petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a rehearing 
with respect to the Court's decision, dated March 31, 1992, in 
the above-referenced matter. 
II. BACKGROUND 
BJ-Titan initiated an appeal, seeking review of the 
Utah State Tax Commission's (the "Commission") decision, dated 
July 2, 1990, that imposed a sales tax on BJ-Titan's oil and gas 
well stimulation (cementing, fracturing and acidizing) services, 
and on a transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Hughes Holding Com-
pany to BJ-Titan. By its decision dated March 31, 1992, this 
Court affirmed the Commission's ruling that the cementing ser-
vices provided by BJ-Titan are subject to sales taxation; how-
ever, the Court reversed the Commission's ruling that BJ-Titan's 
fracturing and acidizing services are taxable, and remanded the 
proceeding to the Commission, in part, to identify that portion 
of the deficiency attributable to the acidizing and fracturing 
services. Finally, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision 
that the transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Hughes to BJ-Titan 
was subject to sales taxation, 
BJ-Titan petitions the Court for a rehearing solely 
with respect to the Court's affirmance of the Commission's 
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decision that BJ-Titan's cementing services are subject to sales 
taxation, BJ-Titan is not seeking a rehearing of the Court's 
decision with respect to the acidizing and fracturing services, 
nor is BJ-Titan seeking a review of the Court's decision with 
respect to the imposition of a sales tax upon the transfer of 
motor vehicles, 
III. ARGUMENT 
The Court should have reversed the 
Commission because the Commission 
failed to apply the proper legal 
standard in construing Utah Code Ann, 
S 59-15-4 (1986). 
Through numerous decisions of this Court over the 
years, it is well established that statutes which impose a tax 
are to be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority. For example, in Utah Farm 
Bureau Insurance Co. v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 421, 3 47 
P.2d 179, 182 (1959), the Court stated that it is a 
"well-recognized rule that in case of ambiguity, uncertainty or 
doubt, taxing statutes are construed liberally in favor of the 
taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority." The Utah 
Farm Bureau Court cited with approval its prior statement in 
Pacific Intermountain Express Company v. State Tax Commission, 8 
Utah 2d 144, 329 P.2d 650, 651 (1958), "that taxing statutes are 
to be construed strictly, and in favor of the taxpayer were 
doubtful." In support of this legal standard of statutory 
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construction, the Pacific Intermountain Court cited to Gould v. 
Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S.Ct. 53, 62 L.Ed. 211, 213 (1917) 
(emphasis added), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated: 
In the interpretation of statutes levying 
taxes it is the established rule not to 
extend their provisions, by implication, 
beyond the clear import of the language used, 
or to enlarge their operation so as to 
embrace matters not specifically pointed out. 
In case of doubt they are construed more 
strongly against the government and in favor 
of the citizen^ (Citations omitted.)1 
See also Merrill Bean Chevrolet. Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 
549 P. 2d 443, 446 (1976) ("we have also held taxing statutes, 
where doubtful, are to be construed strictly, and in favor of the 
taxpayer."); Parsons Asphalt Products. Inc. v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 617 P. 2d 397, 398 (1980) ("even though taxing statutes 
should generally be construed favorable to the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority . . . " ) . 
As recent as this Court's decision in Chris & Dick's 
Lumber & Hardware v. State Tax Commission. 791 P.2d 511, 517 
(Utah 1990), Associate Chief Justice Howe, in his dissenting 
opinion, reconfirms the existence of this legal standard and 
1
 The Court's decision in B.J.-Titan is inconsistent with this 
rule because it permits the Commission to tax services (i.e., 70% 
of what BJ-Titan sells to customers), thereby enlarging the scope 
of Utah's sales tax statute, without specific statutory authori-
zation. The cementing services are more fully described in 
BJ-Titan's brief. These services are not incidental to the sale 
of tangible personal property. 
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notes the susceptibility to the omission of its application. 
Justice Howe stated (emphasis added): 
Another crucial rule of construction which 
has been ignored by the majority is that tax-
ing statutes are to be construed strictly and 
in favor of the taxpayer when doubtful. Par-
son Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980); 
Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 8 Utah 2d 144, 146, 329 P.2d 650, 
651 (1958). 
BJ-Titan files this Petition for Rehearing because 
(1) the Commission failed to apply the appropriate legal standard 
in construing the application of a sales taxing statute to 
BJ-Titan's cementing services, and (2) this Court gave deference 
to the Commission's decision even in light of the Commission's 
failure to apply the correct legal standard. 
This proceeding, in relevant part, concerns BJ-Titan's 
appeal of the Commission's decision to impose a sales tax upon 
BJ-Titan's cementing services pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-15-4 (1986). This statute does not establish an exemption 
from taxation; instead, it imposes a tax. This is a critical 
distinction, a proper understanding of which is essential to the 
correct resolution of the issue presented here. 
As the Court's opinion in B.J. -Titan notes at the out-
set, the "basic facts [in this case] are undisputed." Decision 
at l. Consequently, the sole issue is the construction of terms 
in a statute which imposes a tax on the sale of "tangible 
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personal property." By necessary implication, the statute does 
not impose a sales tax on services, unless specifically stated 
otherwise. In sum, the case raises a single legal issue: What 
is the proper construction and application of a taxing statute to 
undisputed facts? 
BJ-Titan contests the application or imposition of a 
taxing statute upon the cementing services it provides, not upon 
the sale of concrete used in rendering those services. BJ-Titan 
is not seeking an exemption from sales taxation. In cases deal-
ing with exemptions, a different legal standard of construction 
applies, i.e., the statute is strictly construed against the tax-
payer who has the burden of showing his right to the exemption. 
Even though taxing statutes should generally 
be construed favorably to the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority, the 
reverse is true of exemptions. Statutes 
which provide for exemptions should be 
strictly construed, and one who so claims has 
the burden of showing his entitlement to the 
exemption. 
Parson Asphalt Products at 398 (emphasis added). 
Because BJ-Titan is contesting the application or impo-
sition of a taxing statute to its cementing services, BJ-Titan is 
entitled to have that statute construed liberally in its favor 
and strictly against the Commission. Correspondingly, because 
BJ-Titan is not seeking an exemption, BJ-Titan does not have "the 
burden of showing [its] entitlement" to relief. This distinction 
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in application of burdens is at the crux of BJ-Titan's Petition 
for Rehearing. 
The Commission not only failed to apply the proper 
legal standard (i.e., construing the application of a sales tax-
ing statute liberally in favor of BJ-Titan, and strictly against 
the taxing authority), but treated BJ-Titan as if it were seeking 
an exemption and applied the wrong standard of construction 
(i.e., strictly construing the statute and placing the burden on 
BJ-Titan to "show [its] entitlement to the exemption." Parsons 
Asphalt, supra). This fundamental error, which necessitates a 
reconsideration by the Court, is clearly illustrated in the Com-
mission's decision, wherein it stated: 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission 
finds that Petitioners failed to establish by 
a preponderance of evidence that its oil and 
gas stimulation services are exempt from 
sales and use tax. 
Decision of Commission at 11 (emphasis added). Based on this 
incorrect legal standard, the Commission ruled against BJ-Titan, 
holding that BJ-Titan was not entitled to an exemption from sales 
tax since BJ-Titan had not carried its burden of showing its 
entitlement to the exemption. However, as discussed above, this 
is the improper legal standard to apply to this issue. Again, 
BJ-Titan was not seeking an exemption from taxation, but was con-
testing the application or imposition of a taxing statute to its 
cementing services. Therefore, under the correct legal standard, 
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the Commission was required to liberally construe the statute in 
favor of BJ-Titan and strictly against the taxing authority, 
which the Commission clearly failed to do. 
Had the correct legal standard been applied, which 
requires the construction of taxing statutes in favor of the tax-
payer, no tax should have been imposed where the factors weigh 
both in favor and against taxation, as in this case. In close 
decisions, where there is doubt or uncertainty as to whether the 
2 
taxing statute should apply, the taxing statute should be con-
strued to impose a sales tax only when there is "substantial" 
evidence or factors dictating or compelling the imposition of a 
tax. 
Besides explicit language in the Commission's decision 
3 . . . 
applying the wrong legal test, the Commission's decision to tax 
services in what the Court found from undisputed facts to be a 
"close case" further demonstrates that the Commission failed to 
apply the correct legal standard of construction. In its deci-
sion, this Court stated that it was a "close decision" (Decision 
at 9) as to whether a sales tax should be imposed with respect to 
2
 See Utah Farm Bureau Insurance, supra. at 182 ("in case of 
ambiguity, uncertainty or doubt, taxing statutes are construed 
liberally in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against the tax-
ing authority") (emphasis added). 
3
 Nor is there any discussion or implication in the Commis-
sion's decision that it considered or applied the correct legal 
standard. 
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BJ-Titan's cementing services. The Court specifically listed 
certain factors which militate both for and against taxation in 
this case. The Court also concluded that because the facts in 
this case weigh both for and against taxation, it is not clear or 
certain that a tax should be imposed. This Court stated: "We 
cannot say that these facts compel a conclusion that the cement-
ing services rendered in this case are incidental to the product 
delivered [and are thus taxable]." Decision at 9. But since the 
facts did not compel a finding to the contrary, the Court 
deferred to the Commission's decision, stating that it was not 
4 . . 
arbitrary or unreasonable. Decision at 9. However, when the 
Commission fails to apply the proper legal standards of statutory 
construction, its decisions are in error and invalid ab initio 
and should not be given any deference. Instead, the Commission's 
decision should be corrected by applying the correct legal stan-
dard. Given this Court's findings that the facts do not compel a 
conclusion that the services are incidental, the taxing statute 
must be construed in favor of BJ-Titan unless the Court finds the 
facts weigh substantially in favor of taxation. 
4
 The Court's citation to Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax 
Commission, 805 P. 2d 176 (Utah 1990) and McKendrick v. State Tax 
Commission, 3476 P.2d 177 (1959), in support of the rule that the 
Commission's decision will not be overturned unless unreasonable, 
are inapposite because, presumably, the Commission in those cases 
applied the correct legal standard. 
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BJ-Titan's argument that a tie goes to the taxpayer, 
not the Commission, and that there should be substantial evidence 
or factors weighing in favor of taxation before the Commission is 
5 
upheld, is not a new principle. In Ralph Child Construction Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422, 424 (1961), 
a sales and use tax case, this Court stated that there must be 
"substantial evidence" before a taxing statute, which is required 
to be construed in favor of the taxpayer, is imposed upon a tax-
payer. In support of that evidentiary rule, the Court cited 
Pacific Intermountain Express Company, supra, which is the semi-
nal case the Court has repeatedly cited for the principle that 
taxing statutes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority. Based on that principle, 
the Court stated that the State must procure "substantial evi-
dence" before a taxing statute would apply. 
5
 BJ-Titan's brief points out that the Commission was attempt-
ing to interpret a taxing statute, as opposed to an exemption 
statute, in concluding that the services BJ-Titan sells are sub-
ject to a sales. See Brief of Petitioner at 17. Unfortunately, 
the Court's opinion appears to have overlooked this point and 
does not mention or discuss the proper standard for reviewing 
taxing statutes and exemption statutes. For example, the Court 
did not cite Utah Farm Bureau, Pacific Intermountain, Merrill 
Bean or Parson Asphalt. Although the Court cited Ralph Child 
Construction, the case is cited in support of the "second theory, 
known as the ultimate user or consumer." Decision at 5 and 8. 
There is no discussion as to Ralph Child Constructions require-
ment that the Commission produce "substantial evidence" in impos-
ing a taxing statute, discussed infra. 
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In Ralph Child Construction, the taxpayer ("Child Con-
struction") was appealing the Commission's assessment of sales 
and use taxes. Child Construction had purchased certain utility 
poles from Southam of Spanish Fork and set the utility poles in 
the ground under a general contract with the Emery County Union 
Telephone Association for the construction of a telephone system. 
Neither Southam nor Child Construction reported the sale of util-
ity poles to the Tax Commission and thus no sales tax had been 
paid. 
Under the relevant statute, if personal property was 
sold "upon the representation" of a taxpayer that such property 
was purchased for resale, the taxpayer would nonetheless incur 
liability of the tax if the property was not, in fact, subse-
quently sold. Hence, the Commission argued that Child Construc-
tion was purchasing the utility poles for resale rather than for 
consumption, but then failed to sell the poles. Southam had gone 
out of business and thus the Commission could only look to Child 
Construction to collect the sales tax. 
While the Court upheld the assessment of tax against 
Child Construction on other legal grounds, with respect to the 
Commission's attempt to impose a tax under the resale statute, 
the Court, citing Pacific Intermountain Express Company, supra, 
stated that there must be "substantial evidence" before the stat-
ute would apply. 
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The state has the burden of producing sub-
stantial evidence which would reasonably jus-
tify a finding that Child made such a repre-
sentation. Pacific Intermountain Express 
Company v, State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 2d 
144, 329 P. 2d 6700 (citation in footnote 2) 
(emphasis added). 
The rule of liberal construction thiis embraces both the 
facts and the law in cases where either or both are uncertain. 
This rule was not followed here, either by the Tax Commission or 
this Court. 
In summary, this Court stated that BJ-Titan's case was 
a "close decision." The Court then listed specific factors which 
militated both for and against taxation, and concluded that the 
facts did not dictate a decision in favor of taxation, an analy-
sis which was based upon a faulty legal prentise. That the Com-
mission failed to apply the proper legal standard is clear from 
the explicit language of the Commission's decision, and the deci-
sion itself, which found in favor of taxation when there was no 
6
 Instead, this Court deferred to the Commission's application 
of the "essence of the transaction" test which concluded that 
cementing services were, in essence, the sale of tangible per-
sonal property. In support, the Court cited Haroldsen and 
McKendrick, both of which are inapposite. McKendrick involved 
the sale of an artificial limb and Haroldsen involved the sale of 
computer software. In both cases, the sale of tangible property 
concluded the transaction. Here, the essence of the transaction 
was customized services at the job site, not cement in a hole. 
Even under the "essence of the transaction" test, the Commis-
sion's decision is unreasonable because it imposes a 100% tax on 
a transaction that is 70% service. 
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substantial or compelling evidence to do so. Based on this, the 
Court should reverse the Commission's decision. 
IV. RELIEF REQUESTED 
Based on the foregoing, BJ-Titan respectfully requests 
that the Court grant BJ-Titan's Petition for Rehearing. BJ-Titan 
seeks to have this matter remanded to the Commission with 
instructions as to the proper legal standard to be applied in 
this case; i.e., that, in interpreting or construing the statute 
to the applicable facts of this case, the relevant statute must 
be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer and strictly 
against the Commission. Moreover, this Court should direct the 
Commission to find substantial evidence in the record which com-
pels a decision that BJ-Titan Services should be taxed. Should 
the Court desire oral argument or additional written briefs on 
this issue, BJ-Titan would be pleased to provide the same. 
V. CERTIFICATION 
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Petition 
for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this /^ day of April, 1992. 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW 
RICHARD M. MARSH 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
REHEARING to the following on this M' day of April, 1992: 
Brian Tarbet 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
~~)tAJm)j/fr 
RMM/041092A 
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APPENDIX "A" 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOoo 
B.J.-Titan Services, 
Petitioner, 
No. 90i 
F I L ! 
March 
368 
D 
1, 1992 
State Tax Commission, 
Respondent. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, Brian Tarbet, Salt Lake City, for 
State Tax Commission 
Randy M. Grimshaw, Maxwell A. Milder, Richard M. 
Marsh, Salt Lake City, for BJ-Titan 
STEWART, Justice: 
BJ-Titan Services Company (MBJ-Titan*) seeks review of 
the Utah State Tax Commission's ruling which imposed sales and 
use taxes on BJ-Titan's oil and gas well stimulation services 
and on a transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Htighes Holding 
Company ("BJ-Hughes") to BJ-Titan. We reverse in part and 
remand. 
FACTS 
The basic facts are undisputed. The appeal before the 
Commission involved two consolidated cases: ftuqhes Tool Co. v. 
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal 
No. 88-1500, filed May 31, 1988, and BJ-Titan, Services Co. v. 
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal 
No. 88-1644, filed June 24, 1988. The Auditipg Division of the 
Utah State Tax Commission assessed additional! sales and use 
taxes against Hughes Tool Company in the amouht of $239,842.89 
for the period October 1, 1983, to March 31, 1985, and against 
BJ-Titan Service Company in the amount of $116,574.11 for the 
period April 1, 1985, to September 30, 1986. BJ-Titan appealed 
the assessment to the Utah State Tax Commission. 
In April 1985, Hughes Tool Company, through its 
holding company, BJ-Hughes, and Titan Services, Incorporated 
("Titan Services"), combined to form BJ-Titan, a general 
partnership. BJ-Hughes contributed 12 percent of BJ-Titan1s 
assets, and Titan Services contributed 28 percent. 
Accordingly, BJ-Hughes received a 72 percent interest in the 
partnership, and Titan Services received a 28 percent 
interest. Assets contributed by BJ-Hughes included certain 
motor vehicles, titled and registered in Texas. BJ-Titan did 
not pay a sales and use tax on the vehicle transfers. The 
Auditing Division included the sales and use tax on the 
transfer in its assessment against BJ-Titan. 
BJ-Titan provides oil and gas well stimulation and 
stabilization services. The well stimulation services 
generally consist of three different activities: cementing, 
hydraulic fracturing, and acidizing. Cementing is the 
placement of cement and other slurry compositions into various 
places in the well. BJ-Titan uses a special grade of Portland 
Cement in combination with any of 54 additives, depending on 
well conditions. The most important part of cementing is the 
injection of the cement slurry between the well hole and the 
well casing. Once poured, the cement permanently affixes the 
casing to the surrounding hole and cannot be removed. The 
cementing process stabilizes the well and isolates producing 
zones within the well. Hydraulic fracturing extends the bore 
laterally by injecting fluids into the well. Acidizing is an 
extension of hydraulic fracturing and uses hydrochloric acid in 
combination with other agents to improve well flow capacity. A 
substantial portion of BJ-Titan's audit deficiency relates to 
cementing services.1 
BJ-Titan delivers its products to the well site and 
makes recommendations to the well operators regarding the 
precise formulas to be used and the method of placement in the 
well. Well operators decide whether to accept or reject the 
recommendations. Contracts between BJ-Titan and operators 
contain a specific provision which states that "work done by 
BJ-Titan shall be under the direction, supervision and control 
of the owner, operator, or his agent and BJ-Titan will perform 
the work as an independent contractor and not as an employee or 
agent of the owner or operator." BJ-Titan uses specialized 
equipment and trained personnel in providing stimulation 
services. 
BJ-Titan bills customers for a lump sum and does not 
separately itemize labor and materials. The price, however, 
includes a charge for sales tax on the materials. BJ-Titan 
then remits the collected tax to the State Tax Commission. 
Based on the amount of tax remitted, the materials portion 
1. According to BJ-Titan, cementing comprises 92 percent of 
the services involved in the audit deficiencies. 
No. 900368 2 
comprises on average about 30 percent of a tofcal contract 
price. BJ-Titan does not pay sales tax on thp materials it 
purchases• 
The parties dispute exactly what BJ-Titan's customers 
purchase. The Commission contends that BJ-Titan's customers 
purchase the final product (the cement foundation and chemical 
materials) in the hole where it has its only value and that the 
product acquires value only after the materials and services 
together have been provided. BJ-Titan asserts that its 
customers actually purchase improved well perjformance, rather 
than the materials used to achieve that resul|t. 
COMMISSION'S RULINGS 
The Commission affirmed the Audit Division's 
assessment and denied BJ-Titan's petition. The Commission 
found that BJ-Titan had failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that oil and gas stimulation services and the 
transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Hughes to pj-Titan were 
exempt from sales and use tax. The Commissiojn 
that "the portion of its product which BJ-Titl< 
services is really charges 'for fabrication oji 
which is part of the process of creating a fii 
tangible personal property' (the cement whicq 
well operators) . . . .H The Commission 
the Petitioner is in the business of oil and 
the Petitioner operates as a retailer of tanc^ i 
property. The services that it provides to 
the sale of these products is a necessary component of the 
final product." Second, the Commission concluded that BJ-Titan 
was not a real property contractor within the meaning of the 
administrative rules and, thus, was not exempt from sales and 
first concluded 
:ian has labeled as 
>jr installation 
Jnished article of 
is sold to the 
furtlher found, "Where 
gas stimulation, 
ible personal 
ts customers in 
use taxes. Third, the Commission concluded 
of motor vehicles was subject to sales and us 
the Commission concluded that BJ-Titan faileq 
the Commission had a formal policy of taxing 
transfers on an aggregate basis, i.e., taxind 
proportion of the noncontributing partner's Equity ownership 
the partnership. 
tjhat the transfer 
e taxes. Finally, 
to establish that 
motor vehicle 
the value at the 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The primary issues on appeal are wh 
Commission erred (1) in determining that BJ-
retailer of tangible personal property in pr 
acidizing, and fracturing to its customers; 
that BJ-Titan was not a real property contra 
determining that the transfer of vehicles wa 
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DISCUSSION 
Standard of Review 
As the proceedings in these petitions commenced after 
January 1, 1988, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), governs 
the standards of review. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22 
(1989); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1991); Savage Indus., Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 668-69 (Utah 1991). 
well Stimulation Services 
We first address whether the Commission erred in 
determining that BJ-Titan operates as a retailer of tangible 
personal property in providing cementing, acidizing, and 
fracturing to its customers and, therefore, that sales and use 
taxes should be imposed on all charges billed to its 
customers. Because the tax was assessed for the years 1983 to 
1986, statutes from those years are controlling. 
Since the 1930s, Utah law has imposed a tax on retail 
sales of tangible personal property. See Utah Code Ann. 
#59-15-4(1) (Supp. 1986) (currently § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987 
& Supp. 1991)). The Code defines a retail sale as every sale 
by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer and not for 
resale. IdL § 59-15-2(4) , (5), (6), (7) (Supp. 1986) 
(currently § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987 & Supp. 1991)). However, 
the Code exempts from tax sales of tangible personal property 
to a manufacturer which becomes an ingredient or component part 
of other tangible personal property. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-15-2(7) (Supp. 1986) (currently § 59-12-104(27) (Supp. 
1991)). Although the Legislature did not define the term 
"tangible personal property" until 1991, the Commission's rules 
in effect in 1986 defined it as "all tangible or corporeal 
things and substances which are dealt in or capable of being 
possessed or exchanged." Utah Admin. R. 865-26S (1986),2 
A review of our case law analyzing these provisions 
reveals two emerging lines of theory. The first, known as the 
essence of the transaction theory, focuses on the nature of 
what was sold and whether it primarily entails tangible 
personal property. See Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 805 P.2d 176 (Utah 1990); Snarr Advertising, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 20 Utah 2d 55, 432 P.2d 882 (1967); 
2. The current Code defines tangible personal property, inter 
alia, as "all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and 
commodities [and] all tangible or corporeal things and 
substances which are dealt in or capable of being possessed or 
exchanged." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)(a)(i-ii) (Supp. 
1991) . 
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McKendrick v. State Tax Comm'n, 9 Utah 2 
(1959); Youno Electric Sign Co. v. Utah 
Utah 2d 242, 291 P.2d 900 (1955); see al 
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 681 P.2d 
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the essence of the transaction is one fo 
tangible personal property. The analysi 
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to an 
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The second theory, known as the ultimjate user or 
consumer theory, focuses on whether a retail sale is made to a 
user or consumer and not for resale. See Tummurru Trades, Inc 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah l|990) 
State Tax Comm'n, 561 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1977); Sj 
Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 214, 390 P.2d 130 (1964); Barrett 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 9H 
Child Constr, Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah! 
Hardy v, 
ine v. State Tax 
Inv. Co. 
422 (1961); Olson CQnStC COt v 
42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961); Nickerson 
Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 30, 361 P.2d 
Cement Co. V, State Tax Comm'n/ n o 
98 (1964); Ralph 
2d 53, 362 P.2d" 
State Tax Conim'n, 12 Utah 2d 
Pump & Mac[h. Co. v. State 
520 (1961) 
Utah 135, 
Qlsen Co, v, State Ta? Comm'n, 109 Utah (1946); £^£ 
P.2d 324 (1946); Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v 
Comm'n, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942); 
Finding Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227, 
; Union Portland 
170 P.2d 164 
State 
563, 
Tax 
168 
Western Leather & 
48 P.2d 526 
transactiori theory, this 
of the 
(1935). Unlike the essence of the 
theory examines the nature, rather than the siibject, 
transaction. The theory acknowledges that tangible personal 
property is often used in the process of making other property 
and in rendering services. The legal question posed is, who is 
the ultimate "user or consumer" of the tangible personal 
property? Transactions with the ultimate usetf 
subject to sales tax. This analysis is based 
legislative intent to tax the last possible ti 
or consumer are 
on a presumed 
ansacticn. 
A synthesis of these two theories and the cases 
decided under them reveals five distinguishable categories. 
The first category addresses whether the transaction is 
essentially a transfer of tangible personal property. These 
cases involve an inseparable combination of tangible property 
and services in developing the product and examine the essence 
3. However, the Code specifically levies sales tax on certain 
services: "all services for repairs, renovations, cleaning, or 
washing of tangible personal property or for the installation 
of tangible personal property rendered in connection with other 
tangible personal property." Utah Code Ann. $ 59-15-4(1)(e) 
(Supp. 1986) . 
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of the transaction to determine whether the object of the 
transfer is tangible property or services. For example, in the 
repair of electric signs, the essence of the transaction is 
services, even though a part of the transaction includes a 
transfer of tangible personal property, such as wires, clips, 
and lights. S££ Young Electric Sign Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 242, 291 P.2d 900 (1955). Similarly, the 
sale of custom-made advertising displayed on road signs owned 
by the seller is in essence a transaction for services, even 
though the sign itself is individually constructed for each 
sale. See Snarr Advertising, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 20 
Utah 2d 55, 432 P.2d 882 (1967). In contrast, the sale of 
artificial limbs essentially entails a transaction for tangible 
personal property, even though part of the transaction includes 
fitting the limb and training the user. See McKendrick v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177 (1959). Also, 
the sale of customer lists on printed sheets and magnetic tapes 
is in essence a transfer of tangible personal property, even 
though the seller helps select and modify the lists. See Mark 
O. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 805 P.2d 176 (Utah 
1990) • 
In analyzing cases in the first category, this Court 
has relied on several factors for determining whether the 
object of the transaction constitutes tangible personal 
property or services. These factors include (1) the value of 
the tangible property to the customer in relation to that of 
the services; (2) the cost of the property to the seller; 
(3) the customer's rights to possession or ownership of the 
property; (4) the ability to separately itemize charges for the 
property and services; (5) the extent to which the services 
increase the value of the property or to which the property 
increases the value of the services; and (6) the extent that 
such services are rendered in similar transactions. In these 
cases, we generally defer to the Commission's application of 
these factors and its determination of what constitutes the 
essence of a transaction. Accordingly, the Court will not 
overturn that determination unless it is unreasonable or 
arbitrary. See Mark O. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
805 P.2d 176, 181 (Utah 1990); see also McKendrick v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 1~7, 178 (1959;. 
Cases falling within the other four categories stress 
the general question of who the user or consumer of tangible 
personal property is. These cases differ from the first 
category in that they involve transactions which include 
severable services and property portions. As noted above, the 
Code taxes only sales to users or consumers not for resale. 
Also, the Code specifically exempts sales of ingredients and 
component parts used in manufacturing. 
If these categories were placed upon a taxation 
continuum or spectrum, the manufacturing category would be 
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) .1 Such materials 
s land are not 
parts of the 
Near the manufacturing extreme is th£ auto repair 
category, where purchases are not taxable. Here, the customer, 
not the repairer, is the ultimate consumer ofjauto parts 
because the parts are installed without alteration and can be 
easily separated from the labor performed in installing them. 
A similar example is shoe repair where the customer, not the 
repairer, is the consumer of leather used in a repair job. See 
western leather fr Finding COt v, State Ta* Corjim'n, 87 Utah 227, 
48 P.2d 526 (1935). 
The professional services category f^lls in the middle 
of the spectrum, where some purchases are taxible while others 
are not. Here, tangible personal property used in providing 
professional services is consumed by the provider rather than 
the client. For example, a dentist is the cohsumer of 
materials used in his or her practice, such a^ plastics, 
cements, and metals, even though the patient lis the end 
recipient of the property. See Hardy v. Statft Tax Comm'n, 561 
P.2d 1064 (Utah 1977). To the extent that su :h materials 
patients, 
chain who can be 
cannot practically be itemized for individual! 
dentists are the last persons in the property 
taxed. Similarly, a motel owner is the consumer of towels, 
blankets, soap, and other property used in the rental of rooms, 
even though the customer is the recipient of their use. See 
Sine v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 214, 390|P.2d 130 (1964). 
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Contractors make up the final category and the other 
extreme of the spectrum. Here, purchases clearly are taxable. 
Although analytically similar to other labor-intensive 
businesses such as dentistry, the Court has developed a 
different rationale for resolving the issue of taxability for 
contractors. Contractors are deemed consumers of building 
materials used in the construction of buildings and other 
facilities. For example, contractors are consumers of concrete 
pipe, cinder blocks, and related concrete products used in the 
construction of highways and buildings, Utah Concrete Prods. 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), 
steel building materials used in the construction of buildings, 
Olson Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 
1112 (1961), modular building units used in the construction of 
buildings out of the state, Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), and telephone poles used 
in the construction of telephone systems; Ralph Child Constr. 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 (1961). 
Contractors are the last persons in the property chain to deal 
with the products before incorporation into a separate entity 
and before the products lose their identity as building 
materials. Also, they purchase the materials not to resell 
them in their original form, but for the purpose of changing 
their nature from personal to real property. For this reason, 
the exemption for ingredients or component parts of tangible 
personal property does not apply to contractors. Barrett Inv. 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998, 1000 
(1964) .4 
In the instant case, the Commission taxed BJ-Titan's 
services because it found the services to be "a necessary 
component of the final product." The Commission stated, "The 
customer is purchasing the final product in the hole where it 
has its only value to the customer. The final product has 
value to the customers of BJ-Titan only after the materials and 
services together have been provided." With respect to 
cementing, the Commission found that "BJ-Titan synthesizes 
materials and services to provide a finished product which 
stabilizes the pipe located in the well." With respect to 
fracturing, acidizing, and nitrogen work,5 the Commission 
found: 
4. The current code expressly removes real property from the 
definition of tangible personal property. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-102(13)(b)(i) (Supp. 1991). 
5. Although the Commission included "nitrogen work" in this 
finding, the parties have not discussed this service in any 
detail. Trade materials submitted in the record indicate that 
nitrogen is used to extend fracturing and acidizing and as an 
ingredient in cementing. We assume that in using "nitrogen 
work," the Commission meant nitrogen services as similar to 
fracturing and acidizing. We therefore treat it as such. 
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In each of these services the personal 
property used in stimulation becomes part 
of the production of the well and is 
returned when oil and other fluids arte 
taken from the well. In these cases, 
BJ-Titan has sold the products to the final 
consumer, and sales tax should have b^en 
collected on that sale to the final 
consumer. 
BJ-Titan argues that the Commission's! findings are 
erroneous because the services BJ-Titan provides are 
substantial and not incidental to the sale of tangible personal 
property. Section 59-15-4(1) implicitly grant|s the Commission 
some discretion in determining whether a certa|in transaction 
constitutes a sale of "tangible personal property." See Morton 
Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Taj Comm'n, 814 P.2d 
581, 588 (Utah 1991). Thus, in accordance wit^ h UAPA and our 
previous cases on this issue, we will not ups^t the 
Commission's determination that the essence of| a transaction is 
tangible personal property unless it is unreasonable or 
arbitrary. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (h) (il), (iv) (1989); 
Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 805 P.2d 176, 181 
(Utah 1990); McKendrick v. State Tax Comm'n. i Utah 2d 418, 347 
P.2d 177, 178 (1959) . 
With respect to the cementing services, the Commission 
could reasonably conclude that well operators intend to 
purchase the concrete in the well hole and th^t the services 
provided by BJ-Titan, such as developing the proper mixture of 
concrete slurry and injecting the mixture into the well, are 
incidental to that final product. Applicatior| of the factors 
used in determining whether tangible personal property is the 
essence of a transaction to this case results in the following 
relevant facts on both sides of the issue: The value to the 
customer lies in the combination of materials and services, 
neither having much value without the other; the materials 
comprise on average 30 percent of the charge ^o a customer; 
well operators acquire possession, if not ownership, of the 
cement; BJ-Titan apparently has the ability t$ charge 
separately for the materials and the services; although it has 
not done so in practice; and such materials ajpe not typically 
sold without the services. 
We cannot say that these facts compel, a conclusion 
that the cementing services rendered in this <j:ase are 
incidental to the product delivered. In a cl^se decision such 
as this, we defer to the Commission's judgmenj:. The Commission 
is in a better position to weigh the evidence and to assess an 
individual case in light of the many determinations that the 
Commission makes on close but different factual situations.6 
6.We note that the cement used by BJ-Titan ^alls within the 
(continued on p. 10) 
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With respect to the hydraulic fracturing and acidizing 
services, however, we hold that the Commission's determination 
that a well operator purchases in essence tangible personal 
property is unreasonable. Unlike cementing, fracturing and 
acidizing produce no finished tangible product. Chemicals are 
injected into the well to stimulate well flow and returned as 
part of production when oil and other fluids are taken from the 
well. The well operator is not concerned with retrieving the 
chemicals, or the use of any particular chemical. The value to 
the customer lies purely in the service, not in the chemicals, 
and there is no real transfer of possession or ownership of the 
chemicals. Therefore, the essence of BJ-Titan's fracturing and 
acidizing services is providing services, not tangible personal 
property, and the chemicals consumed in providing those 
services are merely incidental and thus not taxable. Because 
the Commission did not determine what proportion of the tax 
deficiencies relate to cementing and what proportion relate to 
fracturing and acidizing, we remand for that determination. 
We next address whether the Commission erred in 
determining that BJ-Titan is not a real property contractor. 
BJ-Titan argues that it converts tangible personal property, 
cement, into real property, and therefore, it is a real 
property contractor and should have paid sales tax on its 
purchases of the materials used to produce the cement. As 
noted above, BJ-Titan billed its customers for a lump sum, 
without itemizing labor and materials. Each price, however, 
included a charge for sales tax on the materials used. 
BJ-Titan did not pay sales tax on the purchases of the raw 
materials. The Commission concluded that these practices, 
"were not those of a real property contractor but were those of 
a retail sales business which purchased the materials for later 
resale." 
The different treatment applied to real property 
contractors is based on the proposition that building materials 
lose their identity as such when they become part of a building 
or facility. In other words, they are converted from tangible 
personal property into real property. The issue is not, as 
BJ-Titan urges, which party to the transaction converted the 
cement into real property, but rather, who the ultimate user or 
consumer of the cement is. Because the essence of the 
transaction between BJ-Titan and a well operator is tangible 
personal property, BJ-Titan purchased the raw materials used in 
producing its cement not for consumption, but for resale, and 
the labor expended in producing the final product merely 
increased the sales value of that product. The ultimate 
(footnote 6 continued) 
Commission's definition of "tangible personal property," i^ j 
"all tangible or corporeal things and substances which are 
dealt in or capable of being possessed or exchanged." Utah 
Admin. R. 865-26S (1986). 
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consumer is the well operator. In this respect, BJ-Titan is 
like a concrete mixing company hired to arrive) at a site and 
pour concrete into a hole dug by and between fiorms erected by 
the general contractor, who is the consumer of' the cement. The 
contractor purchases delivered and poured concrete and leaves 
the formulation of the blend of ingredients to the concrete 
provider, as conditions require. The labor ex| 
producing and pouring the concrete and the cos| 
all included in the price. 
pended in 
t of delivery are 
Moreover, a well operator is in the business of making 
wells produce. The well operator contracts with BJ-Titan to 
obtain a concrete anchor around the well casing which 
stabilizes the well and isolates zones of production identified 
by the operator. The operator provides BJ-Titjan with all the 
necessary well data and runs the cementing equipment down the 
bore. In essence, the well operator purchases a certain amount 
of cement at a certain location in the well. It does not seek 
to purchase real property, nor does the cement become 
inseparably meshed into a greater facility whiich itself is the 
object of the transaction. From the standpoint of the well 
operator, who may or may not own the well, th^ cement has not 
lost its identity as tangible personal property. 
Vehicle Transfer 
Finally, we address whether the Commission erred in 
holding that the transfer of vehicles from BJ+Hughes to 
BJ-Titan was subject to sales tax. 
BJ-Titan is a Texas general partnership established in 
1985 by BJ-Hughes Holding Company and Titan Services 
Incorporated. In forming BJ-Titan, BJ-Hughesicontributed 
72 percent of the assets and Titan Services contributed 
28 percent. Among the assets transferred by pj-Hughes were 
motor vehicles titled and registered in Texas^ The Commission 
found that this transfer was properly taxed. We affirm. 
The Sales Tax Act levies a tax on ev0ry retail sale of 
tangible personal property made within the state. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-15-4(1)(a) (Supp. 1986). The term ^retail sale" 
means every sale within the state of Utah by a retailer or 
wholesaler to a user or consumer, unless otherwise exempted. 
Id. § 59-15-2(6). Expressly excluded from th^ definition of a 
retail sale are Hisolated [and] occasional sales by persons not 
regularly engaged in business." IJ&. However, a sale of a 
vehicle Hof a type required to be registered under the 
provisions of the motor vehicle laws of this state" is not an 
isolated or occasional sale, unless it is a transfer "in a 
business reorganization where the ownership of the transferee 
organization is substantially the same as to |the ownership of 
the transferor organization." Id. 
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BJ-Titan first argues that its vehicles are not "of a 
type required to be registered," citing an exception to 
registration for interstate commercial vehicles duly registered 
in another state and not owned by a state resident. Because 
this issue was not raised before the Commission, we decline to 
address it. 
BJ-Titan next argues that the transfer of motor 
vehicles is exempt from sales tax because the transfer occurred 
in a business reorganization where the ownership of the 
transferee organization is substantially the same as the 
transferor organization. To be excepted from sales tax under 
§ 59-15-2(6), there must first be a "business reorganization" 
and second the ownership of the transferee must be 
"substantially the same" as the ownership of the transferor. 
The Act does not define either "business reorganization" or 
"substantially the same." 
The Commission concluded that the transfer of assets 
from two business entities to form and organize a new legal 
entity is not a business reorganization. Rather, the two 
original entities have formed a new and separate entity. The 
Commission also concluded that the ownership of BJ-Titan, the 
transferee, is not substantially the same as the ownership of 
BJ-Hughes, the transferor, because BJ-Hughes held less than an 
80 percent interest in BJ-Titan. The 80 percent figure 
represents an informal policy of the Auditing Division based on 
the Internal Revenue Code. Because this is primarily a 
question of statutory interpretation, we will grant relief only 
if the Commission has erroneously interpreted the law. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989). 
The general rule on reorganizations is as follows: 
A reorganization . . . is not ordinarily the 
combination of several existing 
corporations, but is simply the carrying out 
by proper agreements and legal proceedings 
of a business plan or scheme for winding up 
the affairs of, or foreclosing a mortgage or 
mortgages upon, the property of insolvent 
corporations, and the organization of a new 
corporation to take over the property and 
business of the distressed corporation. 
19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2514 (1986). Clearly, under 
this rule, a transfer of assets by two separate entities to 
create a partnership, a new legal entity, is not a "business 
reorganization." However, even assuming that a reorganization 
includes the transfer of assets by one corporation to another 
entity, the ownership of the transferee and transferor in this 
case is not substantially the same. 
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The chapter on franchise and privilege taxes in 
1986 Code defined wreorganization" for the purposes of 
§§ 59-13-13 and 59-13-14 to include "[a] transfer 
corporation of all or a part of its assets to 
corporation, if immediately after the transfer! 
or its stockholders or both are in control of 
to which the assets are transferred . . . ." 
§ 53-13-12(9)(a) (Supp. 1986). The Code definbd the term 
"control" as "the ownership of at least eighty per cent of the 
voting stock and at least eighty per cent of the total number 
of shares of all other classes of stock of thq 
Id. § 53-13-12(10) . 
the 
by a 
another 
the transferor 
the corporation 
lutah Code Ann. 
corporation." 
In the instant case, BJ-Hughes received a 72 percent 
interest in BJ-Titan. We believe the 80 percent requirement 
adopted by the Commission is reasonable in li^ht of the 
definition in the franchise and privilege taxqs chapter of the 
Utah Code. 
BJ-Titan also argues for the first time on appeal that 
the transfer was not a "sale," because BJ-Hugfyes owned the same 
assets before and after the transfer and, thu^, there has been 
no consideration for a sale to have taken placje. Because the 
issue was not raised before the Commission, w^ decline to 
address it.7 
7. BJ-Titan 
Olsen, 679 S 
LiMXey, 405 
Sons, Inc. v 
Northern Telecom, Inc. 
IBEC Indus., Inc. v. 
(per curiam); Roberts & 
curiam). 
absorbed 
aircraft 
parent. 
and that 
relies on three cases: 
W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1984); 
N.E.2d 289 (Ohio 1980) 
Kosvdar. 330 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio 1^75) (per 
In Northern Telecom, a subsidiary corporation was 
into the parent corporation and registration of an 
owned by the subsidiary was transferred to the 
The court held that no sale for consideration occurred 
the transfer of title was not subject to sales tax: 
The record discloses that as a Result 
of the transaction Northern Telecom, Inc.'s 
position was not changed; it continued to 
have complete control over the same issets; 
it gave up nothing, no money or othet 
consideration was exchanged. Nothing was 
effected other than an internal corporate 
reorganization. The subsidiary received 
nothing for its transfer of assets to the 
parent; indeed, following the transaction 
there was no subsidiary to receive a 
consideration. 
Northern Telecom, 679 S.W.2d at 449. 
In IBEC, the court held that a transfer of vehicles from a 
corporation to a new wholly owned subsidiary was not a sale for 
sales tax purposes because it lacked consideration. The court 
reasoned that there was "merely a shifting of'assets by a 
(continued on p. 14) 
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Finally, BJ-Titan asserts that the Commission had a 
policy of taxing motor vehicle transfers on an aggregate basis 
and that the Commission erred in allowing the Auditing Division 
to deviate from that policy. The "aggregate" rule assesses 
sales tax on the value of assets transferred to a partnership 
based on the non-contributing partner's equity ownership in the 
partnership. By contrast, the "entity" rule, used by the 
Auditing Division, assesses the tax at the whole value of the 
transfer. 
Under UAPA, we will grant relief where an agency 
action is "contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons 
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(iii) (1989). 
To be entitled to relief, however, a party must show that the 
agency's prior practice is firmly established. See Morton, 814 
P.2d at 595, The Commission found that the evidence presented 
by BJ-Titan, the opinion testimony of a single witness, was 
insufficient to establish that the Auditing Division followed 
an aggregate policy. BJ-Titan argues that the Commission 
"cavalierly ignored" a memorandum written by the witness while 
she was still an employee with the Commission and an informal 
opinion from the Attorney General's office. We have reviewed 
this evidence and the record and affirm as reasonable the 
Commission's finding that the aggregate rule was not a formal 
policy. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the Commission's ruling that the cementing 
services provided by BJ-Titan are subject to sales and use 
taxes. We reverse the Commission's ruling that the fracturing 
(footnote 7 continued) 
corporation from one division to another." IBEC, 405 N.E.2d at 
290. In Roberts & Sons, a partnership transferred all its 
assets to a newly formed corporation. In the transaction, 
certain vehicles were issued new titles and registrations. The 
court held that no sale of the vehicles had occurred for 
purposes of sales tax because "[t]here is nothing in the record 
in this case to indicate that there was any 'consideration' or 
'price' paid for the vehicles." Roberts & Sons, 330 N.E.2d at 
438. However, for a transfer similar to that in IBEC in which 
the court held that consideration was present, see Hawthorn 
Mellodv, Inc. v. Lindley, 417 N.E.2d 1257, 1262-63 (Ohio 1981). 
These cases necessarily turn on a question of fact: Was 
there consideration for the transfer of assets? To make this 
determination, the terms and circumstances of the transactions 
must be examined. Because this argument was not presented to 
the Commission below, a finding of fact on consideration has 
not been made, and we will not indulge in such evidentiary 
endeavors . 
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and acidizing services provided by BJ-Titan are taxable and 
remand for a division of deficiencies attributable to 
cementing, fracturing, and acidizing. We affirm the 
Commission's ruling that the transfer of motor vehicles from 
BJ-Hughes to BJ-Titan was subject to sales and use taxes. 
Reversed in part and remanded, 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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